SPS Commerce, Inc.Full report →1 / 14
SPSCNASDAQThe short version

SPS Commerce, Inc.

SPS Commerce runs a cloud EDI network connecting retailers and suppliers, with 96% recurring revenue and 100 straight quarters of growth. Its shares have fallen roughly two-thirds from a 2024 peak on a growth-rate reset.

From a $215 peak on 31 July 2024, the stock fell to $50 by May 2026 before recovering to $73 — a two-thirds drawdown while revenue kept compounding.
Mkt cap $2.8BP/E FY27E 13.8×
$73.39
Share price
$2.79B
Market cap
0.17%
Adj. FCF yield vs 8.5% bar
100
Consecutive quarters of growth
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Snapshot

SPS Commerce, Inc. in numbers

Price
$73.39as of 2026-07-31
Mkt cap
$2.8B
12m perf
−32.6%
3m ADV
$36.9M
Year to Dec (USD)2023202420252026E2027E2028E
Sales536.9M637.8M751.5M791.2M841.2M903.8M
EBITDA95.9M107.6M139.4M266.6M293.9M329.1M
EBIT77.2M88.9M118.3M241.8M268.4M305.7M
EBIT margin14.4%13.9%15.7%30.6%31.9%33.8%
EPS1.762.042.464.915.316.00
P/E41.7×36.0×29.8×14.9×13.8×12.2×
FCF yield4.0%4.9%5.5%6.5%7.2%7.9%
Consensus: S&P Capital IQ (CapIQ) · as of 2026-08-02Derived from run data; ratios use the latest price.
IThe business
The business

A retail EDI network that reads like a utility — 96% recurring, 100 straight quarters of growth

$751M
FY2025 revenue+17.8% YoY
96%
Recurring revenue
~54,600
Recurring customers
~$14,300
Average annual spend
  • Connect once, sell to thousands. Suppliers plug into SPS to trade purchase orders and invoices with any retailer already on the network; SPS maintains each retailer's compliance rules and onboards the partners.
  • A network that compounds. Management says its value 'increases exponentially with scale' — a new customer usually finds its partners already connected, and no single customer is worth even 1% of revenue.
  • A long runway, self-measured. SPS pegs its market at $11.1B across ~275,000 potential customers, putting it near 7% of the dollars — a figure sourced from its own consultant.
The economics

69 cents of gross profit per dollar, but service work caps the operating margin

SPS FY2025 margins
  • The moat and the margin ceiling are one choice. SPS runs the integration work itself — full-service — which makes customers sticky but puts a services organization between 69% gross margin and a 15.7% operating margin, 724bps below peers.
  • Leverage banked in cash, not GAAP. Strip acquired-intangible amortization (4.9% of revenue) and operating margin is 20.7%, level with peers; adjusted EBITDA margin ran 31%, and management targets 35%+.
  • Clean conversion, flattered headline. Operating cash was 1.9x net income, but the 20% FCF margin adds back $53.7M of stock comp (7% of revenue) and excludes ~$140M/yr of acquisitions.
IIIThe story now
The fit

Outside the framework's universe (U2 not met); contested: P2

The pillar ledger
TestResult
Scale (U2)$2.79B vs $10B bar — miss
Year-10 durability (P1)Met · p 0.79
Yield vs 8.5% bar (P3c)~0.17% · not met
Diagnosis (P5)Temporary · p 0.58
FCF consistency (P2)Contested
ConfidenceHigh
  • A scale test, not a quality test. The framework only screens companies above a $10B market cap. At $2.79B, SPS sits about 72% below that line, so the screen stops before any dislocation setup is underwritten.
  • Even the peak fell short. The July-2024 high of $215 implied only ~$8.2B on today's share count — no price in this window clears the bar. Two model families agreed unanimously.
  • The business still passes the durability gate. Year-10 revenue durability (P1) is met with high conviction; the miss is size, not staying power.
The dislocation

A two-thirds fall that landed on earnings days, not a drift

  • A dated trigger. On the Q2 2025 call management reset its multi-year growth algorithm from '15%+' to high single digits; the stock fell 22% that session — one of four earnings-day legs in a 651-day, 77% decline.
  • Emotion-driven selling. Volume ran ~6.96x its trailing median at the peak of the fall, well past the 2x line the framework treats as capitulation.
  • The counter, same breath. The 22% drop landed on a 10% EPS beat and the volume clustered on scheduled earnings days — as consistent with an orderly re-rating as a panic.
Inverted signature

It fell on beats — six straight quarters of double-digit EPS surprises

Normalized EPS surprise vs consensus
  • The numerator never fell. Every quarter through mid-2026 beat consensus EPS by 10–18%; consensus FCF is modeled up from $162M to $221M and normalized EPS from $4.13 to $6.00 by 2028.
  • What got repriced is growth. A stock that falls on beats is not being punished for the quarter it delivered; forward revenue growth reset to ~5.3% from the 17.8% just posted.
The diagnosis

Growth reset, not earnings collapse, and the diagnosis splits near even

0.58
Diagnosis: p(temporary)
~750
Organic net customer adds, FY2025
$23.5M
Loss on 3P divestiture
  • An inverted impairment. The adversarial trial put the odds the damage is temporary at 0.58 — near even, spread 0.13. Earnings never fell; the reset was to the growth rate and the multiple.
  • The count that broke. FY2025's 20% customer jump was almost entirely the acquired Carbon6 cohort; organic net adds were ~750, and the third-party unit was later sold at a $23.5M loss.
  • What decides it. Whether recurring customers and ARPU grow off the ~54,600 base without a large deal, or whether the deceleration proves structural.
Durability

Ten straight positive cash-flow years — until you subtract the acquisitions

Free cash flow, FY2016–FY2025
Reported FCF is monotone; on the adjusted basis (less stock comp and average acquisitions) recent years fall to ≈ −$2.3M (FY2024) and +$4.7M (FY2025).
  • The gate passes. Revenue rose every year from $193M to $752M — a ~16% CAGR over 100 quarters — so year-10 durability (P1) clears with high conviction.
  • The consistency test splits. On the framework's adjusted definition — FCF minus stock comp minus average acquisitions — recent-year cash falls near zero, because acquisition outlays ran ~$143–148M. Jurors split cannot-determine vs not-met (P2 contested).
  • Raw conversion is clean. Operating cash ran 1.9x net income with no receivables build; the adjustment, not the business, is what turns the series thin.
Self-help

Record buybacks into the fall, yet the share count still drifts up

Share repurchases, cash ($M)
  • The engine is running. Buybacks stepped up from $0 in FY2023 to $37.6M and then $114.3M, against a $300M authorization; in Q1 FY2026 SPS deployed ~100% of free cash flow to repurchase $47.1M.
  • But the count hasn't inflected. Diluted shares rose from 36.3M (FY2020) to 38.0M (FY2025) — a +0.9% CAGR — because repurchases only roughly matched stock comp. On the hard-fail path, the repurchase pillar (P4b) is not met.
  • Fortress behind it. $151M cash, no funded debt, no dividend — the balance sheet outlasts the problem trivially (P4a met).
IVThe price
What you pay

A 0.17% adjusted FCF yield against an 8.5% bar

FCF yield vs the fortress bar
  • Even the charitable reads miss. A fortress balance sheet sets the bar at 8.5%. Adjusted FCF yield is ~0.17% — about 833bps short — because ~$94M/yr average acquisitions and $54M of stock comp consume nearly all of $152M reported FCF.
  • No read clears it. Unadjusted FCF (5.46%) and consensus FCF (5.80%) both sit well below 8.5% — the setup fails on its own terms (P3c not met).
The forward path

Consensus yield rises toward the bar, but never reaches it within three years

Consensus FCF yield vs 8.5% bar
  • Close, not there. Consensus forward FCF yield rises 5.80% → 6.55% → 7.20% → 7.93% through FY2028 and never reaches 8.5% inside the three-year window. Probability it clears: ~0.105.
  • And these overstate it. The consensus figures are unadjusted — they don't subtract stock comp or acquisitions — so the framework's adjusted forward yield is lower still.
The re-rating

The multiple that priced high-teens growth is gone, and the target test can't be drawn

14.9x
Forward normalized P/E
$72.73
Mean analyst target
~5.3%
Consensus fwd revenue growthfrom 17.8%
  • Priced as the new normal. At $73 SPS trades ~14.9x forward EPS and ~6.5% forward FCF yield; the sell-side has converged targets to a $72.73 mean, at or below spot.
  • No re-rating arithmetic. With adjusted FCF running near zero after stock comp and acquisitions, there is no stable normalized figure to capitalize at the 8.5% bar — the framework records the re-rating math as unavailable.
What to watch

Durable and cash-generative, but too small for this framework — and now priced near where the sell-side sees it.

This distills a fixed fit test built tab by tab; it is one framework's screen, not investment advice.

Compiled from the full report · 2026-08-02 · For information, not investment advice.